EPSTEIN.FINAL.DOC

10/10/2008 3:27:37 PM

Property Rights, Public Use, and the
Perfect Storm: An Essay in Honor of
Bernard H. Siegan

RICHARD A. EPSTEIN*

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
II.

III.

IV.

WHY THE PERFECT STORM ................................................................................. 612
ELEMENTS OF THE PERFECT STORM.................................................................... 614
A. Restrictive Zoning Requirements ............................................................. 614
B. Land Use Exactions ................................................................................. 615
C. Procedural Abuses................................................................................... 616
D. Systematic Undercompensation ............................................................... 619
E. State Subsidies for Development Programs ............................................. 621
THESE FACTORS AT WORK ................................................................................. 622
A. Kelo ......................................................................................................... 622
B. Didden ..................................................................................................... 624
C. Atlantic Yards.......................................................................................... 625
D. Soldier Field ............................................................................................ 627
E. Love Field................................................................................................ 628
CONCLUSION: THE ORIGINALIST QUESTION ....................................................... 630

* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of
Chicago. Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution; Visiting
Professor, NYU Law School. My thanks to Paul Laskow, NYU Law School, Class of
2009 and Melissa B. Berger, NYU Law School, Class of 2010, for their usual excellent
research assistance.

609

EPSTEIN.FINAL.DOC

10/10/2008 3:27:37 PM

It is both a great honor and sad duty to deliver the Keynote Address at
the Bernard Siegan Memorial Conference on Economic Liberties, Property
Rights, and the Original Meaning of the Constitution. It is, I think, not
inappropriate to start with a few words of praise for Bernie both as a
human being and as an influential scholar. I am pleased to say that
Bernie received his law degree from the University of Chicago in 1949,
after which he formed a law firm in Chicago with his lifelong friend,
Herb Karlan. That firm specialized in land use issues and gave both
Bernie and Herb a close-up view of how the system of land use
regulation worked in one of the major urban centers in the United States.
After they had been in business for many years, both Bernie and Herb
developed a strong academic itch, which led them to liquidate their firm
in order to enter the academy, with Herb going to Southwestern Law
School and Bernie coming to the University of San Diego. What is
remarkable about this venture was that Bernie did not enter the academic
lists until he was close to fifty years of age. Notwithstanding his late
start, Bernie quickly became a star as a result of his writings on the areas
he knew so well: land use planning and economic liberties. Through his
two best-known books, Land Use Without Zoning1 and Economic Liberties
and the Constitution,2 Bernie opened a productive dialogue in areas in
which the dominance of state power had long been unquestioned.3
Bernie’s style of argumentation was more intuitive than technical.
Bernie could not quite understand why the legislature should want, or be
allowed, to interfere with the ordinary use of land rights, or to tell people
that they could not engage in honest occupations without the prior
approval of the state. To him, the defense of individual liberty was
indeed a perfectly self-evident proposition, while the manifold schemes
of regulation imposed upon it that limited its exercise were anything but.
I can still vividly recall a conference on Economic Liberties and Property
Rights that was held at the University of San Diego School of Law in
early December 1983, where Bernie went to great lengths to present his
own views. The tension between him and one of his major intellectual
adversaries, Robert Bork, was quite evident. Bork’s major theme was
that constitutional law must be understood in light of its central objective
to protect legislative and democratic institutions from constant oversight
and nullification by unelected judges. At one point, he was driven to say
1. BERNARD H. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING (1972).
2. BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (2d ed.
2006). The distinctive break from the past came with the publication of the first edition
of this book in 1980.
3. See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926)
(upholding zoning); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32–36 (1954) (upholding broad
powers of condemnation).
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that courts should sustain any legislation that a government lawyer can
defend with a straight face, even though he knew that the underlying
arguments advanced in favor of that statute were false. That vivid
formulation is not far removed from the dominant “rational basis” test
that dominates so much of modern constitutional discourse: sustain a
statute that has any tenuous connection to any conceivable social end.
Bernie, of course, did not quite see matters in that fashion. For him, the
courts were there to protect individuals from domination by political
institutions that often showed scant respect for individual rights. Bernie
was no doctrinaire libertarian. He only thought that the state should
have to present justifications for regulation that were commensurate with
the important property rights and economic liberties that it sought to
abridge. For Bernie, this insight stemmed both from his extraordinary
sense of personal decency and his deep knowledge of our constitutional
history. To him, the Constitution was not an empty vessel into which
scholars could pour whatever political vision they accepted. Its basic
contours speak of the protection of private property and of contract.
Although the Founders did not subscribe fully and uniformly to the
classical liberal vision of limited government and strong property rights,
those two phrases taken together offer the best guidance to our basic
constitutional direction, at least in the absence of more specific textual or
historical guidance.
My task in this essay is to show the wisdom of the Siegan position by
stressing what happens when courts decide systematically to ignore it in
favor of a constitutional view that is far closer to that of Robert Bork
insofar as it gives the legislature free reign over both economic liberties
and property rights. I cannot do this with respect to the full range of
issues that crop up under these two capacious heads. But it is possible to
show how a wide range of unsound judicial decisions have created a
perfect storm in land use regulation that has done much to harm the
vitality of land development in the United States. Part I of this essay
identifies the confluence of factors that leads to the creation of this
perfect storm. Part II then examines the key elements of the basic
mixture, covering those which make private development more costly
and those which reduce the cost of using the eminent domain power.
Part III then looks at five recent decisions that illustrate how these
elements work together in actual cases. Part IV concludes with a brief
discussion of the connection between these modern developments and
the inquiry into the original meaning of the Constitution.
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I. WHY THE PERFECT STORM
It is instructive at the outset to explain why I have chosen to address
this topic through the use of the term The Perfect Storm, the title of a
well-known nonfiction book by Sebastian Junger that offers a riveting
account of the 1991 Halloween Nor’easter which resulted in the sinking
of the fishing boat Andrea Gail 575 miles out to sea in the North
Atlantic with the loss of its crew.4 That title brings to the fore the notion
that devastating storms typically take place only with the confluence of
multiple factors, each of which ordinarily has a low probability of
occurrence. The key insight is that the combination of factors has a
synergistic effect, here negative, whose combined force is greater than
the simple sum of the constituent forces, each taken in isolation of each
other.
The Perfect Storm offers an instructive metaphor in dealing with the
law of takings. There is much to be said in praise of incremental
decisionmaking that treats each case on its own merits. Small steps
often mean that judges make fewer mistakes than they would if they
sought to develop some grand theory on the basis of a limited set of facts
drawn from a particular case. But there are also serious difficulties
associated with that cautious approach precisely because it ignores the
synergistic effects that arise from the interplay of different doctrines on
the same set of social institutions and practices. Judges should be aware
of these effects because their decisions rarely take place on a blank slate.
Rather, all decisions in well-traveled areas are made against a context
that includes adjacent doctrines, so that simple prudence asks judges to
take account of how they interact. I believe that this is especially true in
land use cases where all the pressure on procedural and substantive
issues is used to give land use planning officials at all levels of
government the maximum level of discretion in how they proceed. The
pervasive influence of political factions allows these combined powers
to be misused in many settings, yet there are virtually no tools in the
landowner’s litigation toolkit that offer strong resistance to them.
Is there still not a risk of judicial usurpation of the democratic
process? I think that this risk is ever present, especially in cases when
courts require state legislatures to tax and spend. But, in connection
with the multiple forms of state regulation, it is generally overstated. A
more alert and vigilant judiciary that scrutinized legislation need not run
the risk of becoming a super legislature if it observes the usual limitations
on judicial power that are routinely respected in other areas where courts
bring higher levels of scrutiny to all manner of political decisions.
4.
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Here are two examples: The greatness of our First Amendment law
does not rest on the supine judicial position that all speech may be
suppressed so long as there is some conceivable benefit that could result
from its suppression. Rather, we have a set of rules that protect speech
in accordance with the principles of limited government. The state can
counter defamation and fraud; it can impose antitrust restrictions on
newspapers and the like; it can stop various forms of child pornography
and perhaps even obscenity. Go down the list and it is clear that
virtually every sensible form of speech regulation is permissible under a
First Amendment approach that is consciously informed by the classical
liberal orientation. And where the First Amendment cases go off the
rails, as they surely do in the campaign finance cases,5 it is because they
indulge wrongly in the good government assumption of the Progressive
mindset that finds some ostensible public interest rationale for legislation
that tends, inevitably, to skew political power to the haves—the incumbents—
from the have nots—the challengers.
The same basic mindset applies with respect to the dormant Commerce
Clause. Notwithstanding its somewhat shaky constitutional foundations,
its rules offer a powerful counterexample against the Borkian fear that
unelected judges will wreak havoc on the political process. This basic
constitutional principle calls for economic competition across state borders
and thus creates a common market within the United States that has
proved a powerful engine for economic growth and social mobility. The
principle, however, does not take the form of a universal prohibition
against regulation. Rather, its central tenet calls for nondiscrimination that
prevents local favoritism, subject to a police power exception, tightly
watched, to allow the exclusion of noxious substances from the state.6
Wholly apart from the textual objections to the doctrine, its detractors
have been unable to point to any social or economic abuse that stems
from its faithful enforcement. Quite the contrary, the doctrine has
generated enormous social gains by helping to forge a strong domestic
common market.
The legal position with the property rights so dear to Siegan’s heart is
today quite different, for now the rational basis test allows a latitude for
political maneuvering that is unthinkable in areas to which closer
5. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 159–61 (2003) (upholding the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), heavily regulating federal elections, against
First Amendment challenges).
6. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137–38 (1986).
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constitutional scrutiny has been applied. The point of the remainder of
this essay is to explain the perfect storm that arises when these elements
are taken in confluence in connection with state and local takings,
ostensibly for public use. Just what are these elements? This list
contains five that matter: strong zoning laws; the willingness to allow
exactions as a condition for local approvals; procedural standards that
are too rigid or too weak; systematic undercompensation for property
taken; and, lastly, large state subsidies. This list is not in random order.
The first two items discourage private development. The third will in
some contexts discourage private development, but in others the expedited
procedures will encourage the use of the eminent domain power. The
last two practices unambiguously encourage expanded development.
Before looking at some recent public use cases, here is how the drama
unfolds.
II. ELEMENTS OF THE PERFECT STORM
A. Restrictive Zoning Requirements
The first factor that expands government use of its condemnation
power is the restrictive zoning regulations that are imposed widely
throughout the United States. The political dynamics of zoning are hard
to capture in a few sentences, for the practices of zoning can vary widely
across communities. Some communities go out of their way to make it
easy for developers, while others throw every obstacle in their path. In
all settings, takings for public use vary inversely to the intrusiveness of
the state regulation. Where the state allows private developers to
assemble parcels and build, they have little need to rely on the eminent
domain power. Where the obstacles abound, inside deals are more likely
to occur. These judgments about the extent of state regulation do not
carry with them the implication that all types of zoning are illegitimate
regardless of their rationale or effect. But sensible zoning ordinances,
such as some sign, setback, or height ordinances, which increase the
value of property, are rarely impediments to development. More
aggressive zoning will typically impose severe land use restrictions and
is effectively deployed to allow established parties to exclude either
business rivals or unwelcome residents.
In the short run, these obstructionist tactics often pay handsome
dividends to the winning faction. But the entire matter is dogged by a
persistent prisoner’s dilemma game. Each person counts himself victorious
to the extent that he is able to prevent some new home or business from
being built next door, hence the NIMBY motto “not in my back yard.”
But for each time one small faction gains a local victory, others in the
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community may suffer from a global defeat. The political dynamic that
allows immediate neighbors to block in one backyard invites blockades
in all backyards, either simultaneously or successively. The result is an
overall level of development that is lower than many local citizens
would want, coupled with a gradual depreciation of the tax base and
infrastructure on which local communities depend. After several new
entrants suffer bruising defeats in a local neighborhood, the fighting
stops, as astute developers and businesspeople move to the town next
door which has not been burdened with these policies.
There is an inner economic logic at work here. The Tiebout hypothesis
that explains how local governments operate in competition with each
other—even as they maintain local monopolies over some aspects of
their activities—plays itself out.7 The systematic decline then attracts
notice, but at this point, outside capital is reluctant to enter the community
unless and until it receives some assurance that it will not be met with
protracted resistance. And how is this done? By having the municipality
condemn land for transfer so that the program is more or less prearranged in
ways that sharply reduce the developer’s risk. To be sure, this maneuvering
comes at a political price because it is always easier to keep outsiders—
who lack the vote and local ties—out than it is to force insiders—who
have the vote and some local ties—to surrender their property. But there
are no absolutes here, so that sometimes the insider groups that support
the developer are able to run roughshod over the particular landowners
who stand to lose their homes. The administrative state does not follow
a model of strong property rights and develops procedures to match,
both on the public use and the zoning side of the issue.
B. Land Use Exactions
The second element is the frequent use of exactions as a condition for
allowing new development in the local community. The usual game
works like this: A permit to build frequently increases the value of the
affected land by huge margins. The local government treats this private
gain as a form of state largess because it knows that under today’s
capacious definition of the police power, it can impose virtually any
restriction on land use so long as it does not claim a possessory
interest—for example, a public easement over property—that triggers a
7. See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J.
POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
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higher standard of judicial review.8 Hence, it is, in general, fair game
today to impose special charges that make the new developer pay a
disproportionate contribution to local road repairs, subway renovations,
schools, or cultural activities. The local government knows that it cannot
overstep all bounds but, at the same time, it speculates that the large
gains to the new entrant are only inframarginal, so that they can be taxed
away without altering the developer’s decision to go ahead with the
project. The net effect is to try to shift some fraction of the cost of a
public improvement that works to the equal benefit of new and old
residents onto the new residents. In some cases, this strategy will work,
but usually only after protracted negotiations and corresponding delays.
Taken together, the relative overtaxation from the exaction, coupled with
the additional time and expense, operate as a special tax on new
development which is not offset by any special benefit. The upshot is
clear. These commonly used exactions operate like any other tax. They
slow down the rate of private development, which once again increases
the pressure to use the public condemnation power when the need for
more development seems pressing.
C. Procedural Abuses
We thus come to the third element of the perfect storm, which covers
the relaxed standards for setting the timeframe in which land use
decisions are made. In this regard, it is important to understand that the
optimum procedures will invariably take the form of an inverted ushaped curve. Give too little protection, and the local government can
engage in the arbitrary use of power. Give too much protection, and the
local government can use endless delays to kill off new development
that some neighbors oppose. The legal and constitutional ideal is to find
some middle ground suitable in both cases. But, here again, the rational
basis test exerts its baleful influence in a predictable fashion. Where the
local government is intent on keeping the outsiders out, the amount of
process afforded knows no clear end: Final judgments are shunned
because they open the possible path to judicial review.
The threat here is real. One common characteristic of many of the
Supreme Court cases that deal with building permits is that extra process
becomes standard operating procedure. A generation ago, after First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,9 there
was some expectation that a local government that engaged in endless

8. For the complex limitations on easements, see Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 831–37 (1987).
9. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
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delay could be forced to compensate the aggrieved landowner for any
total loss of a property’s interim use. But that protection offered in First
English has turned out to be largely illusory. Calculating the damages
from total temporary takings is not an easy business, especially if the
baseline is not the full use of the property in the interim, but its use value
only under the most restrictive zoning ordinance that could have been
imposed without incurring obligations to compensate. All that requires
is that there be no loss of all viable economic use. There is not a lot of
money in those cases if the damages in cases of temporary total takings
are measured against the paltry returns that local governments can allow.
The situation only gets worse in light of the procedural impediments
that block even that limited avenue of recovery. Chief amongst these is
the rule which was mentioned but not material to the outcome in First
English: the local government was allowed to impose restrictions on use
without compensation so long as it was engaged in the “normal delays in
obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and
the like which are not before us,” because the administrative decision
was implemented early on in the process.10 In retrospect, this concession
by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, writing for the Court, turned out to
be fatal. To be sure, the limitation sounds sensible so long as there is a
fixed upper bound to the length of administrative review, after which
a full compensation obligation kicks in. Indeed, many state statutes
provide for some maximum period during which these administrative
reviews are supposed to be completed.11 The logic here is that all
landowners can expect to go through some abbreviated process at some
time, such that the short dispensation has no disparate impact over time
and reduces the administrative costs of running the compensation.12
Stated otherwise, from the ex ante perspective, the imposition of a short
grace period for government delays is likely to increase the value of all
properties subject to the rule. Indeed, this desirable pattern was the
source of Rehnquist’s caution about “normal delays.” But the term
normal proved to carry no independent normative weight. Instead, the

10. Id. at 321.
11. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 353–54 (2002); see also, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65858 (Deering 1987 &
Supp. 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-90(b) (West 1991) (providing examples of state
laws that limit the duration of administrative review).
12. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Taking Notes: Subpoenas and Just
Compensation, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1081, 1099 (1999).
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period of time allowable for administrative review counted as normal if it
were routinely given. The local governments sensed that the situation
extended their normal review processes and thus effectively blunted the
operation of the First English boomlet. The net effect is that flexible
procedures are routinely available to slow matters down.
To add insult to injury, it has become equally clear that the Supreme
Court has taken the position that federal courts should not be allowed
open to just compensation claims brought against the states under
Section 1983, which speaks—or better, spoke—about the ability to gain
entry into federal court for the vindication of any federal constitutional
right that had been denied under color of state law. In Patsy v. Board of
Regents, which involved civil rights claims for racial discrimination, the
distrust of state governments led the Supreme Court to hold that Patsy
did not have to exhaust her administrative remedies in state court in
order to press her constitutional claim in federal district court.13 They
could just start in federal court and bypass the state system. But Patsy
was distinguished away in Williamson County Regional Planning
Commission v. Hamilton Bank14 on frivolous grounds that show once
again why property rights are second-class citizens in the current
constitutional hierarchy. Patsy had held that no aggrieved party had to
participate in any administrative process at all. As such, there was no
need for that party either to exhaust the many procedural steps that were
available or bear the time and delay of having an administrative decision
adverse to interest. Because there was no need to get into the administrative
system, there was no need to worry about the impact of any final
decision within that system. But in Williamson, Patsy was reinterpreted
to say that it was concerned only with exhaustion and not with
administrative finality, even though Patsy required neither.15 The upshot
was that, after Williamson, a landowner could not escape the administrative
process even after an application for general approval under a local plan
was denied, but was instead forced to seek a variance, which is rarely
granted, and then only after the passage of time has given rise to a
change in local circumstances that was not contemplated when the plan
was first put into effect. The imposition of the finality requirement in
Williamson thus knocked out the direct access to federal court and mired
individual applicants in the state procedural web.
Williamson does not stand alone. Since that time, further procedural
barriers have limited the ability of landowners to bring takings claims in

13.
14.
15.
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federal court,16 or to keep them there even if they obtain initial jurisdiction,
given the application of the various abstention doctrines.17 The details
of these various rules need not be discussed here. The one point that
shines through is that state and local land use planning commissions can
bottle up takings claims indefinitely in administrative maneuvers and
keep them before sympathetic local courts until a final decision is made,
if one is made at all. Twenty-year cycles are not uncommon in takings
cases under the current procedural rules,18 which assume that delay does
not constitute a loss because there is always a chance that the
landowner’s claim will succeed at the administrative level. Imagine
how the world of free speech would look if prior restraints on
publication were judged by the same lax standards.
The procedural situation often takes on a different complexion,
however, when powerful government interests wish to use the eminent
domain power to take land for public use. Once state or local governments,
or both, back a project, then the risk is that administrative processes will
move at warp speed. There is a chance that major actions will be passed
without any legislative or administrative review at all, or that various
requirements for requests for proposals or competitive bids will be
waived in favor of a preferred suitor. These decisions may be challenged in
court, but at this point, the presumption in favor of the propriety of
government action can toss any procedural constraints to one side.
There is no reason to think that this practice should universally occur,
given that the operative go-aheads could easily be made in forums that
do not allow local opposition to galvanize. But the risk is surely here.
And just as too much political protection is unwanted, so too is too little.
D. Systematic Undercompensation
The next spur to aggressive use of the eminent domain power comes
from the systematic undercompensation that is paid out in all public
takings cases. In principle, the correct standard for compensation derives
from the overall design of the Takings Clause. The key point here is that
16. See, e.g., San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 U.S.
323, 342–47 (2005).
17. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. County of Santa Barbara, 96 F.3d 401, 409–10 (9th Cir.
1996) (applying Pullman abstention).
18. See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S.
687, 695–96 (1999) (resulting in a denial of five successive proposals for development of
projects for 344, 264, 224, and finally 190 units, all of which were eventually rejected).
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the genius of the Clause rests in its charting a middle track between two
unacceptable extremes. The first extreme allows the state to take property
only with the consent of its owner, that is, by purchase. The evident risk
in many key land assembly cases is that individual landowners will hold
out for a small fortune and thus shipwreck public projects that in all
likelihood would work social improvements. That holdout risk could be
overcome by simply allowing the state to take any land that it wishes for
public projects, without just compensation.
In principle, states that have perfect knowledge and pure motivations
should only take property when the gain from placing the property in
public hands is greater than the losses sustained by the former private
owners.19 Compensation would be a mere detail because the virtuous
and knowledgeable state would only take on desirable projects, whose
cumulative impact would create across-the-board benefits. From the ex
ante position, all citizens would benefit from a set of rules that dispensed
with the pesky administrative costs needed to value the property so
taken. But of course, Madison’s concern with faction in Federalist Ten
was only the first of many astute observations about the fragility of these
twin assumptions. Governments are often ignorant of the true facts, and
they respond to political pressure.
The combination of these two dangers means that in all cases, the
power of the state to take should be qualified by its obligation to
compensate owners for the losses that they sustain. Now the state still
has a powerful option, but one that can be exercised only on payment.
That payment thus disciplines government behavior by forcing taxpayers
to make honest evaluations of whether they receive from acquiring
public ownership a benefit commensurate with the costs that they
impose—the very thing that does not happen when exactions are freely
allowed. But this system of compensation will work only on one
condition: The price set for government compensation has to be
calibrated so as to leave the individual citizen at least as well off after
the eminent domain power has been exercised as he or she was before.
The current rules fail to do this in systematic ways. They offer no
compensation for the loss of subjective value, which can be quite high
for properties that are not for sale. They offer no compensation for the
legal and appraisal fees needed to challenge a condemnation. They offer
no moving expenses or compensation for loss of goodwill. These
shortcomings are systematic and likely large. There are, to my knowledge,
no systematic errors that cut in the opposite direction, to offset the
undercompensation risk.
19. For an elaboration, see Richard A. Epstein, Property, Speech, and the Politics
of Distrust, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 51–53 (1992).
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The net effect is that the low just compensation rule reduces the costs
to the government of exercising its takings power. Even if nothing were
done to prop up the current flaccid structure of the Public Use Clause,
tighter and more accurate rules on just compensation would raise the
price for the use of the eminent domain power and thus lower the
likelihood of its occurrence. But, as matters stand, the weak rules on just
compensation offer an implicit subsidy which the state can capitalize on
whenever it exercises its eminent domain powers. As with all subsidies,
the lax compensation rules stimulate too much taking for public use.
E. State Subsidies for Development Programs
The last critical weakness in our basic constitutional structure is that it
places relatively few constraints on the ability of the state to create
cross-subsidies among its members. The efforts to restrain various uses
of public resources that help A and hurt B are difficult, because there is
no obvious textual home for the rules. The Constitution is much more
explicit in the way in which it limits the power of the state to regulate
private property than it is with any limitations that it imposes on state
largess with, of course, other people’s money. There have been a number
of judicial efforts to impose limitations on state power to transfer public
land, for example, to favored constituents, of which perhaps the most
famous is Justice Field’s effort to create a public trust doctrine in Illinois
Central Railroad v. Illinois.20 But those rules have no teeth in connection
with shifts in land use patterns for property that remains under state
ownership. Diversion from one group to another is not just a routine
management decision that carries with it no real constitutional implications.21
The same result attaches, for the most part, to the use of cash subsidies
to aid poor or impoverished areas—or rich and successful ones—and has
not been curbed by any general judicial prohibition against transfers.
These transfer payments and cross-subsidies turn out to make a
substantial difference in the land use cases. The current practice is to
offer handsome subsidies to the construction of various stadia on the one
hand, or to general programs of urban development on the other.
Frequently, the result is that the local governments in dysfunctional
communities receive additional funds to expand their operations, when
20. 146 U.S. 387, 453–55 (1892).
21. Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes,
34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 170–71 (2002).
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the better approach is, if anything, to take funds away from municipal
governments that have handled things badly. Since taking land costs
money under the Constitution, the infusion of these funds from outside
the community will increase the scale of land acquisition, which will in
turn increase the pressures on our feeble public use constraint. Yet the
indirect effects of these programs are nowhere taken into account in
dealing with that issue.
III. THESE FACTORS AT WORK
I have not done any systematic study of the frequency and use of the
takings power of the United States Constitution. But careful work
through the Institute for Justice on the scope and frequency of taking
land for public use does make it clear, at the very least, that this is no
small or isolated problem.22 For our purposes, it is sufficient to take
some recent incidents that have resulted in appellate litigation—
doubtless a small part of the overall sample—to show how these factors
play out in a wide array of situations. The two that are most easy to
observe are rapid process and heavy public subsidy, which are present in
these cases.
A. Kelo
The first illustration is of course Kelo v. City of New London, which
resulted in the condemnation of a number of houses for an ambitious real
estate development project that never got off the ground.23 It was
painfully clear that none of the landowners who resisted the government
takeover was engaged in any holdout game. As a matter of principle,
they refused to entertain any government offers at all. Nor did they pose
any blockade problem because the New London Development Corporation
had acquired title to more than enough land to complete any development
project that it chose. New London’s serious difficulties stemmed from
its failure to move quickly enough with the land that was already in
public hands, so that private developers in nearby communities filled the
market niche by building the right kind of hotel and office space before
anything got off the ground in New London.24 New London thus proved
22. DANA BERLINER, OPENING THE FLOODGATES: EMINENT DOMAIN ABUSE IN THE
POST-KELO WORLD 1, 2, 6 (2006), http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/publications/floodgatesreport.pdf.
23. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
24. “By July 2002, . . . Pfizer had been open in New London for a year, and it had
found other hotels in the area . . . . With that demand met, and with the corporate
landscape altered, the company [informed] Corcoran Jennison that the justification for
the hotel was ‘no longer apparent.’” Kate Moran, Developer Says Fort Trumbull Hotel
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itself as maladroit in condemnation as in other elements of land use
management.
Next, there were the evident subsidies in this case. The State of
Connecticut had awarded the City about $73 million in public funds to
run its revitalization program.25 The usual justification was to prop up
communities that had gone through bad times.26 Yet, unfortunately, the
decision rewarded incompetence by giving the money to a city whose
track record left nothing to admire. Armed with the extra money—and,
in all likelihood, fearful of having to return it unspent—New London
embarked on an ambitious program of land acquisition and infrastructure
improvement on a scale that would never have been attempted if all the
needed revenue had to come from taxes on the local community. To be
sure, Kelo exhibited much collective deliberation, which was ultimately
why Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the Court, blessed its
decision. But judging from the output, the deliberation did not lead to an
improvement in the collective decision.
Kelo did not, however, give an automatic clearance to all government
actions that claimed that a particular taking of land was for private use.
Rather, Justice Stevens’s vision of the Clause dovetails perfectly with
today’s dominant view of the administrative state whereby rights to
process and public participation are said to operate as a substitute for the
stronger property rights that limit the exercise of public power under a
classical liberal regime of government.27 In line with this vision, Justice
Stevens wrote that one avenue for public use challenge still remained,
which was to show that the particular takings in question were a mere
pretext in order to supply benefits for some private individuals:
[T]he City would no doubt be forbidden from taking petitioners’ land for the
purpose of conferring a private benefit on a particular private party. Nor would
the City be allowed to take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose,
when its actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit.28

Plan Not Viable Since 2002; Project Became Unrealistic Without Pfizer Commitment,
THE DAY (New London, Conn.), June 12, 2004, at A1.
25. Institute for Justice, Web Release, Prescription for an Ill-Fated Land Grab,
Oct. 18, 2005, http://www.ij.org/private_property/connecticut/10_18_05pr.html.
26. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473.
27. For a defense, see Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government:
Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 578–82 (1984).
28. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477–478 (citations omitted).

623

EPSTEIN.FINAL.DOC

10/10/2008 3:27:37 PM

“Pretext” within this framework has been defined to occur when an
“ostensible public use” is employed to conceal “the desire to achieve the
naked transfer of property from one private party to another.”29 The
word naked is quite evocative, but is intended to cover those cases in
which there is no—or possibly very little—public justification for the
taking in question. The pretext notion was not the focal point in much
earlier takings litigation, but it looms larger now as the behavior of
public bodies has become more aggressive in the wake of Kelo. Here
are some of the key recent developments that mark this important
doctrinal shift.
B. Didden
In Didden v. Village of Port Chester,30 the Village of Port Chester had
entered into a comprehensive development plan under which it delegated
to a private developer, Gregg Wasser, the right to approve or disapprove
all new projects within the official redevelopment area.31 Bart Didden
and his partner Domenick Bologna proposed to place a CVS drug store
within the development area. Wasser told the partners that he expected
either an $800,000 payment or a fifty percent stake in the venture before
he would allow it to go forward. He then made it clear that he would
have the Village condemn the property unless the partners yielded to the
threat—which he carried out the day after they refused to accept his
proposition. Wasser then arranged for a Walgreens Drugstore to take
over the location. It is difficult to credit any public purpose to this particular
maneuver. Either way, the land in question was to be used for a drug
store, so that the case presents no issue of additional adverse
neighborhood effects or local externalities of the sort that new
developments often generate. The question here was not whether a new
drugstore would be built, but only who would get the gains. The case
looks as though the condemnation was only to help Wasser—and those
with whom he worked—maintain dominance over the site. The
instantaneous approval of the condemnation that he received from the
Village only confirms the advantage that the insiders have in these
projects. Even though the overall urban redevelopment plan had
received the usual public vetting, this particular choice, which in no way
advanced the objectives of that plan, was done without any independent
public review. Yet the Second Circuit found that the deference under
29. 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d
1123, 1129 (C.D. Cal. 2001), dismissed and remanded, 60 F. App’x 123 (9th Cir. 2003).
30. 173 F. App’x 931, 932 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1127 (2007).
31. For further commentary and factual background on the Didden decision, see
Richard A. Epstein & Ilya Somin, A Pretextual Taking, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 8, 2007, at 27.
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Kelo carried the day, and the Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari
in the case. The perils of delegated authority should be evident in this
case, even if they prompt no judicial response.
C. Atlantic Yards
Right now a far larger project in New York City also is at the center of
a public use controversy. The Atlantic Yards project in Brooklyn, New
York, will cover about twenty-two acres and “is planned to consist of
sixteen towers and 8.6 million square feet of floor space, including a
sports arena, 6,860 housing units, approximately 600,000 square feet of
office space, and a hotel.”32 Much of the project is located over
dilapidated structures, but the overall size of the project required the
Empire State Development Corporation to order condemnation of a
number of private homes within the area to keep the development
alive.33
Two of the key elements in the public use equation are present in this
case. First, the bidding process here went quite quickly.34 The developer,
Forest City Ratner Companies (FCRC), had only one competitor, the
Extell Corporation, which offered $150 million for a more modest
proposal that did not require it to dispossess any residents from their
homes. Extell also submitted the required twenty-year profit and loss
projections. The FCRC bid was for only $50 million, and did not
contain the required profit and loss projections. Because it included the
basketball arena, the FCRC bid did require uprooting people from their
private homes. The entire bidding and approval process lasted only four
months from May 2005 to September 2005, which stands in stunning
contrast to the twenty-year time frames that abound when real estate
developers seek to develop a project on private lands that the public
authorities oppose as faithful representatives to their local citizenry.
Several features are immediately apparent from this process. The first
is that all stadium deals are financial losers to local governments. To
build these stadia therefore requires that the developer pay less money
going in, and develop a larger area. The differences between the Extell

32. Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F. Supp. 2d 254, 256 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 516 F.3d
50 (2d Cir. 2008).
33. Goldstein v. Pataki, No. 06cv5827, 2007 WL 1695573 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 23,
2007).
34. Goldstein, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 257.
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bid and the FCRC bid are consistent with this point. The question is
whether the truncated process in favor of FCRC would in some sense be
found to contravene the public use requirement, to which the District
Court answered in the negative, in a decision that the Second Circuit
affirmed.35 To be sure, FCRC was well-connected and stands to do very
well from the project, so it is easy to raise suspicion. In this sense, there
exists the type of favoritism that was not found in Kelo, where the
developer, Corcoran Jennison, was only selected after the City of New
London had committed itself to the condemnation of the private homes.
But, as with all large projects of this sort, it is hard to deny that other
people besides the developer will benefit from the offices, hotels, and
homes that are built in the region, so that the deferential standard of Kelo
effectively prevented the private homeowners from blocking the project.
The key problem with subsidies is that they distort the proper margins
for decision, which should ideally allow the taking to occur only to the
extent that its marginal benefits exceed its marginal costs. Yet once the
subsidies are in play, the margins move so that the overexpansion of the
project is a certainty, which is what happened here. Nonetheless, the
judicial reliance on the rational basis test precludes any systematic
examination of the scope of the project. It is worth recalling that in
Kelo, the trial judge tried something of this sort when it ruled that those
homes that stood on the periphery of the development area could not be
taken, while those that were located toward the center could be. In
effect, it held that the more essential homes had to be sacrificed for
public use while the others did not. The Connecticut Supreme Court
rejected the thoughtful decision of the trial judge to split the baby36—
which would have defused much of the public protest in the case—and
the United States Supreme Court, of course, followed suit. That path of
events presaged the outcome in the Atlantic Yards struggle as the
District Court concluded simply: “Once the question of the public
purpose has been decided, the amount and character of land to be taken
for the project and the need for a particular tract to complete the
integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch.”37 The
Court got out of the messy business of balancing and allowed the
overambitious project to go forward at high private cost. The collateral
damage and the likely social losses are both evident.

35. Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008).
36. Kelo v. City of New London, No. 557299, 2002 WL 500238, at *112 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002) (allowing the differential treatment), rev’d in part, 843 A.2d
500, 508 (Conn. 2004) (rejecting it), aff’d, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
37. Goldstein, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 279.
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D. Soldier Field
The Atlantic Yards case is not the only stadium case that is worthy of
note. Some years earlier I worked as a member of the Landmark
Preservation Council of Illinois in an effort to derail the decision by the
Illinois State legislature and the Mayor and City Council of Chicago to
erect a huge addition on top of Soldier Field to allow the Chicago Bears
to construct sky boxes from which to view home games. Friends of the
Parks v. Chicago Park District is not the usual type of public use case in
that the land in question did not start in public hands.38 The property in
question was owned by the Park District, which had already leased the
site to the Chicago Bears.39 The question was whether this additional
construction, which defiled a red list—or highest rated—public monument,
could be stopped as an abuse of state power. Since no private property
was involved, the case did not turn on the public use language of the
Fifth Amendment. But it did turn on the question of whether the deal
with the Chicago Bears ran afoul of the public trust doctrine on grounds
that it represented a gift of public assets, collected in various forms of
local taxes, to the Bears.40 In dealing with this case, the opponents of the
maneuver—of whom I was one—sought to introduce evidence by the
sports-economist Allen R. Sanderson to the effect that the tax burden
was in the order of $600 million while the net increase in the value of
the Bears Franchise was only $300 million.41 That evidence was,
however, excluded on the ground that the local government had full
discretion to decide whether or not to proceed with the plan.
The case has all the hallmarks of bad public deals. There were no
hearings on the legislation that authorized the construction of the new
project,42 which meant that there was no willingness to entertain an
alternative, and cheaper, proposal that would have restored Soldier Field
to its original purpose as a soccer and track stadium by raising up the
floor, which would both have increased its size to allow for these
activities and reduced its capacity and hence its operating costs.43 The
38. 786 N.E.2d 161, 163 (Ill. 2003).
39. Id. at 163.
40. Id. at 165.
41. Allen R. Sanderson, A Home for the NFL Chicago Bears: A Case Study in
Political Economy and Power 8 (June 16, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author), available at http://home.uchicago.edu/~arsx/Bears&SoldierFieldJuly04.pdf.
42. Id. at 5.
43. Id. at 16.
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Bears in turn would have been housed in a new domed stadium that
could have been built near the White Sox Park to take advantage of
shared common infrastructure at that location.44 This total deal, which
would have provided two up-to-date venues, would have cost less than
the renovation of Soldier Field and would not have led to the desecration
of a national landmark.
But, again, none of this mattered in the rational basis universe. Here
the Illinois Supreme Court invoked the test once again, noting that its
earlier decision “in Lappe require[s] us to defer to the legislative
findings announced in the Act unless the plaintiffs make a threshold
showing that the findings are evasive and that the purpose of the
legislation is principally to benefit private interests,” which could not be
established in light of Soldier Field’s extensive use for sporting events.45
In re Marriage of Lappe, on which the Court relied, upheld legislation
that redefined support obligations to children of divorce, but had nothing
to do with the larger political forces at work in this Soldier Field dispute.46
This decision came as something of a disappointment because of a
then recent decision in Southwestern Illinois Development Authority
v. National City Environmental, L.L.C., where the local development
authority had used its quick-take eminent domain power to condemn
private property held by NCE, a metal recycling company, for use of
Gateway, which ran its own race track.47 The decision involved a transfer
of private property through an overdeferential administrative process,
and thus was distinguishable on its facts from the current case.48 But the
distinction is more superficial than real. The use of public power in both
cases worked transfers between private persons. Even though there was
not an outright transfer of the leased property to the Chicago Bears, the
leasehold transaction created vested rights whose value to the team were
far lower than their costs to the public at large. But the unwillingness to
scrutinize the transaction in any of its particulars meant that the case
sailed through. The rational basis test had claimed another victim.
E. Love Field
At this point it becomes an open question of how much fight is left to
the public use limitation. That question might be answered in short
order in connection with the dispute that has taken place at Love Field in

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
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680 N.E.2d 380, 392 (Ill. 1997).
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the North Texas airline market.49 The problem here began in the
aftermath of the major 1978 airline deregulation, with the passage of the
Wright Amendment in 1979—named after House Speaker Jim Wright—
which limited flights out of Love Field.50 Only planes that flew fiftysix or fewer passengers out of the Field could go to any point in the
United States. Other flights had to remain in Texas or land in one of
four contiguous states. The clear protectionist purpose of this statute
was to aid the Dallas Fort Worth Airport, where American Airlines was
the dominant carrier, in resisting competition from Southwest Airlines,
which used Love Field, conveniently located near downtown Dallas.
With the passage of time, the pressure on the Wright Amendment grew.
In response thereto, American Airlines, Southwest, the Dallas Fort
Worth Airport, and the two cities of Dallas and Fort Worth entered into a
comprehensive agreement under which all parties would work toward
the repeal of the Wright Amendment by 2014, but with this catch: The
twelve gates at Love Field that were not owned by Southwest would be
condemned by the Airport authority and destroyed at the earliest
possible moment.51 Owing to the obvious antitrust risk of this market
division, the agreement was expressly conditioned on approval from the
United States Congress, which duly came in 2006.52
The initial round of litigation in this case challenged the agreement
under the antitrust laws. Judge Sidney A. Fitzwater held that the antitrust
conspiracy was obvious from the face of the agreement but that it was
entitled to complete protection under the various antitrust immunities of
the so-called Noerr-Pennington doctrine, with respect to the various
petitioning doctrines,53 and because the parties were compelled to order
the takings under the Wright Amendment Reform Act of 2006,54 which
they were so instrumental in procuring.55 For our purposes, we can
assume that these findings are incontestable, so the question then arises
whether there is a public use challenge to the taking and destruction of
the gates in question. The pretext exception that was announced by
Justice Stevens seems very much at play. The contractual agreement has
49. For all the details, see Love Terminal Partners v. City of Dallas, 527 F. Supp.
2d 538, 543–47 (N.D. Tex. 2007).
50. Id. at 544.
51. Id. at 545.
52. Id. at 547.
53. Id. at 550–52.
54. Id. at 558–60.
55. Id. at 545–47.
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two named private parties, American Airlines and Southwest. The
antitrust judgment suggests that there is a prior judicial finding that the
third party effects of this agreement are negative, so that it is hard to
argue, with a straight face, that this agreement works for the benefit of
the public at large. But stranger things have happened. It is, in principle,
possible for any court to argue that there are other benefits that derive
from this peaceful resolution of a long-simmering dispute. And there are
incredible claims that cutting out the competitors is appropriate to
control air traffic and curb pollution. But there is no explanation why
the entire cutback has to benefit the insiders at the expense of everyone
else. All that can be said at this time is that if this particular agreement
is said to pass the public use test in the face of its per se antitrust
violation, then Justice Stevens’s exception is a true dead letter. We do
not know whether this line of argument will be pursued or, if so, whether
it will prevail. But we do know that each successive relaxation of a
constitutional constraint will induce at least some government agencies
to take advantage of it.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE ORIGINALIST QUESTION
This review of the various cases has profound implications for how we
think about constitutional law. Bernie Siegan was one of the earlier
defenders of the originalist approach to constitutional law, which sought
to extract the meaning of the text as it was understood at the time of the
founding as the sole, or at least dominant, guide to constitutional
interpretation. That originalist view does not condemn us to a static
view of the Constitution in the face of major social and technical change.
For example, the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the
several states is not limited to stagecoaches and sailboats. It covers all
modern technologies that engage in journeys that cross state lines. Yet
by the same token, if a purely intrastate horseback ride were outside the
scope of federal power in 1787, then the corresponding car ride should
be outside its scope today, even though the law cuts very much in the
opposite direction.
The question then arises as to how this approach applies to both the
takings law with its public use requirement as well as other aspects of
the protection of private property and economic liberties. On these
questions, all we know from the text is that its preferred objects of
protection include private property and ordinary contractual liberties.
There is not a trace of positive rights to jobs, housing, health care, or
anything else. But by the same token, the developed law in these areas
was quite weak. The takings jurisprudence, for example, had not yet
confronted any systematic cases where property was not taken into
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possession by government agents, who chose to pass restrictions on its use
and disposition. I have argued that the line between these two classes of
takings is made of gossamer on the ground of simple structural
analogies. What sense does it make to say that someone may exclude
the government from land that he is not allowed to enter, use, or sell?
But others, notably William Treanor in this Conference, have taken the
opposite position.56 Similarly, the early cases give no indication of the
extent to which the police power could limit the exercise of liberty and
property, as that issue only came to the fore toward the end of the
Marshall Court.57 It would be nice if we could find some authoritative
texts on these key doctrines, but the historical record is noticeably
reticent in connection with both the Takings Clause and the Contracts
Clause, for example.
In the face of this gap, how then does an originalist proceed? I think
that there is only one answer. The overall structure of the Constitution is
one that concentrates on limited federal powers and the protection of
individual rights to property and contracts. We know that these rights
are in no sense absolute. Property can be taken with just compensation,
and is subject to taxation, so the challenge is in how we find the
appropriate limitations. On that question, the one wrong guide is surely
the rational basis test, which affords every presumption in favor of the
use of state power, when any theory of limited government has to
reverse the presumption to the state to give some reason why it must act.
There are many such reasons, including the prevention of fraud and
violence, the control of monopoly, the provision of infrastructure, and
the protection of minors and other incompetents. And it is striking that
whenever the United States Supreme Court announces anything stronger
than a rational basis test, it always gravitates to rules that are limited to
these ends, and which choose means that have a fair likelihood of

56. William Michael Treanor, Take-ings, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 633 (2008). Note
that even the current law deviates from that position by at least allowing compensation in
some regulatory takings cases. The hard question is why, once that barrier is necessarily
crossed, we no longer apply the doctrine to lesser regulations which have huge negative
impacts on value. In dealing with physical occupations, the size of the invasion determines
the amount of compensation owed. Why not here?
57. See, e.g., Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252
(1829) (reconciling local police power with federal commerce power); Brown v.
Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 423, 428 (1827) (dealing with power of state
regulation of imports and importers).
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achieving them.58 So at this point the originalist approach has a direct
tie to the political theory that animated the Constitution. That theory
may not require all of the results that I have urged in this essay and on
other occasions. But it narrows the range of possibilities down far below
what the current courts are routinely willing to tolerate in dealing with
both private property and the liberty to enter into voluntary agreements.
Bernie Siegan was the first modern scholar to see the dangers in this
approach. And now our great homage to him is to recognize that on the
one point that really matters, he was spot on.

58. For my defense of this approach, see Richard A. Epstein, The “Necessary”
History of Property and Liberty, 6 CHAPMAN L. REV. 1, 27–29 (2003).
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